DRC-[ National Council for Defence of the People (CNDP) - dissident forces of General Nkunda]

MIL

TLC

1. Justification for SCS

The CNDP is a military rebel movement out of the Congolese national army. Its leader, General Nkunda, is a Congolese Tutsi, fighting to protect the Tutsi population of eastern Congo (both Rwandan exiles and Congolese Tutsi like the Banayamulenge).

1. Stakeholder size (number of people)

8000 troops[1]

1. Area of Influence
   1. Geographic area

The CNDP is based in the territories of Masisi and Rutshuru in the province of North Kivu, close to the border with Rwanda and Uganda. The CNDP has tried to create local cells, almost creating a parallel administration in North Kivu in areas it controls, including taxation and arbitration of disputes[2].

1. 1. Population subsets

Nkunda argues that the CNDP is protecting the local Tutsi population against attacks by former Rwandan Interahamwe militias and harassment by government forces.[3]

1. Description of Organization
   1. Who are the leaders?

The CNDP is led by General Laurent Nkunda, a former commander in the Rwandan-backed Congolese Rally for Democracy (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie: RCD) rebellion. The DRC government issued an international arrest warrant against Nkunda in September 2005, accusing him of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

1. 1. How does one gain influence in the group?

no data

1. 1. What issues do they care about?

The FDLR occupy the lands of some of the Congolese Tutsi refugees in Rwanda, preventing them from returning. Nkunda has successfully used this group and their links to the 1994 Rwandan genocide as a pretext for his operations and recruitment.

The CNDP has set up both ideological and military training camps. They teach several rudimentary modules, including basic training, officer's training and Christian leadership. The latter is inspired by the evangelical church that Nkunda, a Seventh Day Adventist, belongs to.[4]

1. 1. What does the organizational structure look like?

Nkunda initially defected with two other Tutsi officers from the RCD rebel movement when the democratic transition began in 2003. He recruited a hard core of around 200 soldiers and officers who are under his direct command. The bulk of his troops stem from the 81st and 83rd ex-RCD brigades based in North Kivu who refused to be integrated into the national army.

In the run-up to elections in 2005, Hutu Governor Serufuli, a former Nkunda ally, was co-opted by Kabila and managed to lure away many of the Hutu commanders and troops who were with Nkunda. Since then, however, Nkunda has been able to recruit hundreds of Tutsi combatants from Congolese refugee camps in Rwanda, as well as from the Rwandan civilian population. Given the predominance of Tutsi members in the group's leadership, a large CNDP offensive could quickly generate ethnic hatred and reprisals against their community as a whole.

Nkunda also recruits fighters from Congolese refugee camps in Rwanda. There are an estimated 45,000 Congolese, mostly Tutsi, in the Byumba and Kibuye camps. Many of the recruited are under 18 and the UN has urged Nkunda and his commanders numerous times to demobilise these child combatants. [5]

5. Financial Resources (if applicable)

1. 1. List activities that generate cash flow

The CNDP has numerous funding sources, including links to local Tutsi businessmen who feel sidelined by the newly elected authorities. Many Tutsi businessmen who flourished under the RCD are worried that the new authorities will not respect their investments. Nkunda may also have profited from income from mines in the region, including cassiterite (tin) mines around Masisi and a niobium mine in Luheshe.

During the transition period (2003-2006), Nkunda benefited from links with RCD personnel in the provincial administration. General Gabriel Amisi, the 8th region military commander and former colleague of Nkunda, ensured that the 81st and 83rd brigade received their regular pay during this period, despite Nkunda's forces having refused orders to relocate in integration camps. While this line of funding was broken off when Amisi was replaced in late 2006, CNDP troops still received regular salaries under the mixage process in 2007[6]

1. 1. Income from activities
   2. Profitability

6. Military Resources (if applicable)

1. 1. What arms do they possess

The CNDP uses mostly light weaponry that they have stolen from the Congolese army or bought on the black market. This includes AK-47 assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenades and light mortars. They have also mounted several heavy machine guns on the back of pick-up trucks. [7]

a. Experience level

Nkunda was trained in guerrilla tactics by the Rwandan army, as were many of his commanders. They operate in small units, taking advantage of the terrain to launch ambushes and to flank the national army. They have invested considerable resources in instilling ideology and discipline in their troops, and their units have stood up well in fighting with the Congolese army as well as with UN Mission in the Congo (MONUC) personnel, engaging in very risky but successful infiltrations. [8]

1. Provide a short history of the stakeholder group
   1. What is their origin?

The CNDP was officially founded on 25 July 2006, but developed out of a group called the National Synergy for Peace and Concorde (Synergie Nationale pour la Paix et la Concorde: SNPC), which was founded in Bukavu in December 2003.[9]

At the beginning of the political transition in 2003, a hardliner group within the RCD encouraged several of their leading commanders to refuse integration into the national army in order to create a reserve force in case the transition did not go in their favour. Nkunda felt increasingly betrayed by the RCD, who he felt were pursuing their own individual interests in the transitional government in Kinshasa. The Rwandan government, which had supported Nkunda's rebellion in Bukavu, was also under pressure from donors to cut ties with Nkunda.[10]

1. 1. How have they changed?

The most significant military development of 2007 came in August, when the mixage process between the FARDC and troops loyal to Nkunda broke down. This effectively ended a tacit agreement and eight-month truce with the FARDC, reached at the beginning of the year, to establish the mixed brigades Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, Delta and Echo. In mid August, reports surfaced that pro-Nkunda elements of the mixed brigades were deserting their positions in North Kivu. On 28 August, fighting broke out in Masisi and Rutshuru between pro-Nkunda troops and remaining FARDC soldiers. MONUC reported that Nkunda had recruited combatants in Rwanda, and that the DRC had reinforced its troops in Masisi Territory, North Kivu. Estimates of Nkunda's troop strength ranged up to 8,000[11].

• i. Interests
• ii. Level of influence
• iii. Resources
• iv. etc

1. 1. What are their future goals?

An accord was signed in January 2008, providing for a permanent ceasefire between the government and Nkunda's forces and for his troops to be integrated into FARDC[12]. The key problem of what to do about the Rwandan guerrillas still based in the DRC, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Rwanda ( Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda - FDLR), is not addressed by the accord. That issue is supposedly going to be dealt with by FARDC forcibly disarming the FDLR's 8,000 or so guerrillas. However, the ability of the FARDC to do that is seriously doubted by many analysts watching the region. [13]

As the protection of the Tutsi community and other minorities in the eastern DRC and the obtaining of military and political positions in government through the application of military measures[14] are the goals of Nkunda, and as MONUC announced on 4 December that it was willing to provide last-resort artillery and close air support to government forces in the east of the country, there is the potential for renewed conflict.

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