Lord's Resistance Army

Contry:Uganda

Justification for SCS: The Lord%u2019s Resistance Army (LRA) is officially recognized as a terrorist organization on the Terrorist Exclusion List, under Section 11 of the US Patriot Act.

Stakeholder size (number of people): combatants estimated at 1,500 with several thousand abductees also serving in the ranks (see population subsets)

Area of Influence

a. Geographic area: The LRA has been operating out of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the past three years and was formerly operating out of Southern Sudan and committing atrocities there (especially in Magwi and Torit counties) as well as in Ugand a. There is satellite evidence that the LRA is currently moving into the Central African Republi c. Most of their terrorist activity, however, has been directed against the people of northern Uganda, specifically in the districts of Gulu, Pader, Kitgum, and later, Lira, Apac, and Teso.
b. Population subsets:
i. Within LRA: 80% of the army was abducted (totaling about 30,000 over the course of the conflict), including 12,000 child soldiers of which 5,500 are still missing
ii. Splinter Faction: It is rumored that a group recently committing atrocities in Southern Sudan (the Kajo-Keji region ) is a splinter faction led by Caesar Acelaam
iii. Acholi Diaspora: while this group is certainly not inclusive of the entire Acholi diaspora, the LRA is supported by members of the diaspora in the UK, the US, and Canada

Description of Organization
a. Who are the leaders? Joseph Kony
b. How does one gain influence in the group? Through the military hierarchy
c. What issues do they care about? The organization professes to desire a Ugandan Government whose foundation is based on the Ten Commandments. In reporting on the LRA, the mainstream media often focus on this as the primary motivation behind the war. However, a less radical view of the LRA also exists, especially in the North and amongst those who have studied the conflict. These people see the leaders of the LRA as being relatively rational actors whose primary cause for their terrorist activity has been the marginalization of Northern Uganda and, specifically, the Acholi region. At the same time, the LRA is hardly viewed by anyone as a group of %u201Cfreedom fighters,%u201D especially given the atrocities they have committed over the twenty-year war.
d. What does the organizational structure look like?
i. Dictatorship (Joseph Kony): very similar to a traditional military hierarchy; there are 4 Brigades (Gilva, Sinia, Trinkle, Stockree) each with three Battalions


Financial Resources (if applicable)
a. List activities that generate cash flow
i. Looting and pillaging in northern Uganda and Southern Sudan
ii. There are allegations that the LRA continues to receive funding from the GoS? , through Sudanese Military Intelligence
iii. Sale of girl abductees as brides in Southern Sudan
b. Income from activities
c. Profitability


Military Resources (if applicable)
a. What arms do they possess
i. What type? Armored Fighting Vehicles, Bladed Weapons, Light weapons, mines, small arms
ii. How much?
b. Experience level: Leaders have been trained by the Sudanese army, and some are defectors from the UPD f. Many of the ranks are simply inexperienced children, however.


Provide a short history of the stakeholder group
a. What is their origin? The LRA (formerly the Ugandan People%u2019s Democratic Christian Army) began its campaign in 1987, after Yoweri Museveni, the current president, came to power. There is a sense of mysticism associated with the LRA; rumors suggest that he possessed by the same spirit that possessed Alice Auma (AKA Alice Lakwena), the leader of the Holy Spirit Mobile Forces, which operated from 1986-1987. Over the course of the past twenty years, the LRA has conducted a brutal war against the north of the country. The conflict as killed as many as 500,000 people, destroyed over 50 schools, and displaced approximately 2 million peopl e.
b. How have they changed?
i. Interests: Originally claiming that the basis for the war was a desire for a government that was founded on the Ten Commandments, the rationale for the conflict has become increasingly unclear. Indeed, especially in recent weeks, they seem increasingly interested in gaining political influence, recently demanding 35% of cabinet positions.
ii. Level of influence: After the US Patriot Act labeled the LRA as a terrorist organization, the Government of Sudan (National Islamic Front) stopped providing a haven for the LRA and the rebels moved their base into the Democratic Republic of the Congo. While this seems a likely reason for the decline in influence of the LRA, there are other possibilities, too. The UPDF claims to have killed a number of combatants. Some claim that the indictments by the International Criminal Court have not only brought the LRA to the negotiating table but have also helped to decrease the number of attacks.
iii. Resources: Without overt support from the GoS? , the LRA%u2019s access to resources is more limite d. It has been suggested that they have even resorted to growing their own foo d.
iv. etc
c. What are their future goals? With the resumption of the Juba peace negotiations, the LRA%u2019s primary goal is to protect its leaders from prosecution by the international community. As noted above, in recent negotiations they have also been seeking political power.

1. Jane’s World Terrorist and Insurgency Database: LRA
2. Feinstein Center. “In Search of Security: A regional analysis of armed conflict in Northern Uganda, Eastern Uganda, and Southern Sudan.” Feinstein International Center, 2005.
3. Nyakairu, Frank. “LRA violating truce—Govt,” Daily Monitor. 18 Feb, 2008.
4. Stites, Elizabeth. “Humanitarian Agenda 2015: Northern Uganda.” Feinstein International Center, 2006.
5. Jane’s World Terrorist and Insurgency Database: LRA
6. Nyakairu, Frank. “LRA violating truce—Govt,” Daily Monitor. 18 Feb, 2008.
7. Nyakairu, Frank, Staff Writer, Daily Monitor. Interview, 14 Feb, 2008.
8. Jane’s World Terrorist and Insurgency Database: LRA
9. Jane’s World Terrorism and Insurgency Database: LRA
10. Feinstein Center. “In Search of Security: A regional analysis of armed conflict in Northern Uganda, Eastern Uganda, and Southern Sudan.” Feinstein International Center, 2005.
11. Armed Conflict Database. http://acd.iiss.org.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_ConflictSummary.asp?ConflictID=200
12. Jane’s World Terrorism and Insurgency Database: LRA
13. Project Ploughshares. Armed Conflicts Report: http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/ACRText/ACR-Uganda.html
14. Wasike, Alfred. “LRA breaching pact – Minister Rugunda,” New Vision. 11 Feb 2008.