DRC—[Rwanda]

PSL

Justification for SCS
Rwanda is a state.

Stakeholder size (number of people)
9,038,000 people

Area of Influence
a. Geographic area
North and South Kivu
b. Population subsets
Congolese Tutsi, Banyamulenge, Rwandan Tutsi in Congo

Description of Organization
a. Who are the leaders?
President: Major-General Paul Kagame
Prime Minister: Bernard Makuza
Minister in the Office of the President: Solina Nyirahabimana
Minister of Defence: General Marcel Gatsinzi
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Regional Co-operation: Dr Charles Muligande

b. How does one gain influence in the group?
Power is highly concentrated in the government of the Republic of Rwanda. Military as well as political decisions are made by around a dozen people who surround President Paul Kagame. Moreover, the economy appears to be subordinated to the needs of the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF).
c. What issues do they care about?
Mitigating the security risk from Hutu rebels in eastern Congo and maintaining lucrative deals in resources from DRC.
d. What does the organizational structure look like?
There is effectively no opposition to the RPF elite within the supposedly inclusive new parliament. Most parties represented in the transitional government chose to join the RPF coalition in the September 2003 parliamentary elections, while more oppositional parties were accused of promoting 'divisional' ideologies and banned before the campaign.

Financial Resources (if applicable)
a. List activities that generate cash flow
development aid (main donors World Bank, European Commission, UK, US, Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Germany
trading with resources from eastern Congo
tea and coffee exports
b. Income from activities
development aid: USD340 million (2002/ 2003 numbers)
smuggling – no data available
c. Profitability

Military Resources (if applicable)
a. What arms do they possess?
troops 51,000
equipment :
Armour
Type Role Quantity In Service
T-54/55 1
Main Battle Tank n/a n/a
AML-245 Reconnaissance Vehicle 12 12
AML-60/90 Reconnaissance Vehicle n/a 15 2
RG-31 Nyala
Armoured Personnel Carrier 20 15
VBL
Armoured Personnel Carrier 24 24
M-3 Armoured Personnel Carrier 12 8
BTR series 1
Armoured Personnel Carrier n/a n/a
Artillery
Type Role Quantity In Service
76 mm Gun 24 n/a
105 mm Gun 12 8
RM-70 122 mm
Multiple Rocket Launcher 5 5
120 mm Mortar 200 200
Note:
%uF0B7 RDF/RPA tactics favour the use of easily portable mortars over conventional, static artillery. Very large quantities of mortars have been reported arriving in Rwanda since the mid-1990s. All figures are estimates.
Anti-Tank Weapons
Type Role Quantity In Service
RPG-7 1
Rocket-Propelled Grenade n/a 2,000
75 mm RCL Recoilless Rifle n/a n/a
83 mm Blindicide Anti-tank Weapon 100 50
n/a Grenade Launcher n/a n/a
Note:
1. Unconfirmed reports indicate these may be Egyptian RPGs with anti-personnel warheads.
Air Defence Weapons
Type Role Quantity In Service
Strela-2/2M NATO SA-7a/b Grail Manportable SAM n/a n/a
23 mm ZU-23
Light Anti-Aircraft Gun n/a n/a
Note:
%uF0B7 Alleged sightings, cannot be confirmed.
Infantry Weapons
Type Role
7.62 mm AK-47
Rifle
7.62 mm G3 Rifle
7.62 mm FN-FAL Rifle
7.62 mm FN MAG Machine Gun
30-40 mm Grenade Launcher
60 mm Mortar
81 mm Mortar
The above are the weapons most commonly issued to the RDF, especially since its expansion in the late 1990s. Other infantry weapons in the inventory procured under the previous regime and now non-standard issue are listed below.
7.65 mm Browning
Pistol
9 mm FN 35 Pistol
9 mm MAB PA-15 Pistol
9 mm Uzi
Sub-machine Gun
7.62 mm Galil
Rifle
7.62 mm FN-FAL/HB Machine Gun
7.62 mm MAS 49/56 Machine Gun
0.50" Browning M2 HB
Heavy Machine Gun
b. Experience level
The Rwandan Defence Force (RDF)/ Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) has shown itself capable of deep infiltration, use of ambush, competent small unit tactics, use of local knowledge, rumour and terror. Of note has been the patience displayed by the leadership to wait for advantageous opportunities to present themselves before committing their forces
In a significant departure from the usual practices of African armies, recruits are not brutalised by military discipline. Careful character assessments are made by experienced combat instructors to ensure adequate motivation and high standards of field craft, weapon handling and tactical awareness. The ability for company-sized groups to operate semi-autonomously is the cornerstone of the approximately six-month basic training period. Cadres then go on to learn how terrain, available weapons and psychology influence tactics. Observation of enemy movements to discern personnel habits and general methods of operation is stressed. Drills taught at company level include practical application of such principles as infiltration, dispersal, concentration, night marches, advancing with fire and movement, ambush skills and a high degree of snap-shooting and tactical initiative. Great store is placed on operational tempo, reputation and tactical surprise where possible to act as force multipliers. Tasks are usually assigned with capabilities and experience in mind, even to the point of experience taking precedence over rank. At platoon, company and perhaps even at battalion level these enlightened training philosophies have produced light infantry that is superior in nearly every way to its counterparts on the African continent.

Provide a short history of the stakeholder group
a. What is their origin?
Mobutu at best turned a blind eye to the brutal activities of exiled Hutu Power genocidaires in the Rwandan refugee camps around Goma between 1994 and 1996 but understood that Kigali would sponsor and arm a rebel movement against them inside Zaïre. While this was denied, Rwanda provided most of the AFDL's officers, weapons and logistics and spearheaded the 1996-1997 campaign to liberate the refugee camps and then overthrow Mobutu.
Following Laurent-Désiré Kabila's installation as president, Kigali held great influence in the Democratic Republic of Congo. This was especially true of the military, where Rwandan Tutsi officers continued to provide most leadership and training. Triggered in August 1998, the second war in the Democratic Republic of Congo had similar reasons to the 1996-97 campaign against the Mobutu regime. For Rwanda in 1998, security was not as important a cause as in 1996. The Hutu Power was no longer in control of 600,000 Hutu refugees. As in 1996, however, control over resources was a key issue. As relations with the Kabila regime were deteriorating, Kigali was less and less able to benefit from Congolese resources. More due to a long-term security issue than a contemporary one, the RPF switched its alliance, broke its 1996-97 alliance with Angola in favour of the UNITA rebel army and re-invaded the Democratic Republic of Congo.
b. How have they changed?
In Pretoria in late July 2002 a bilateral peace accord was signed, under which Kinshasa was required to disarm and demobilise all Rwandan opposition militias on its territory. Kinshasa's failure or inability to honour this agreement since then has on several occasions led Rwanda to threaten to reassert its right to re-intervene against negative forces based within the Democratic Republic of Congo. Efforts by MONUC and the FARDC to neutralise the threat of Hutu rebels gained momentum in 2005, reducing the validity of Rwanda's periodic assertions that it stood ready to re-invade to combat the threat itself, although Rwanda kept on supporting first the RCD-Goma rebel movement and now Tutsi-general Nkunda .

c. what are their future goals?
While Kigali has reluctantly and under much international pressure encouraged the major groups to join the Congolese power-sharing agreement, it still wishes to remain the dominant power in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo for the foreseeable future for both security reasons and to continue profiting from the resources there.
Three minor attacks were directed against Rwanda in 2007 , making the claim to have continued security interests in the DRC at least to some extent credible.
In 25 October 2007, the Rwandan government claimed that it had 'verified evidence' that the DRC was collaborating with the FDLR. On 12 November, following UN-facilitated meetings in Kenya, the two states finally agreed to the disarmament and demobilisation of the FDLR, committing not to support or allow border crossings of any rebel group. On 15 December, a joint action plan to deal with the FDLR and other rebel forces operating along the border was agreed. The strategy outlined four stages: sensitisation of rebels to aid voluntary disarmament, cantonment, voluntary repatriation and, finally, forced disarmament through military intervention. The two countries met again on 17 December in Goma to discuss agreements reached in Nairobi and Addis Ababa.